Which of the Following Does Hume Think We Can Know?
journal article
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Published By: International Phenomenological Club
https://doi.org/ten.2307/2953805
https://www. jstor .org/stable/2953805
Hume's moral philosophy makes sentiment essential to moral judgment. But at that place is more individual consistency and interpersonal agreement in moral judgment than in individual emotional reactions. Hume accounts for this by saying that our moral judgments do not manifest our approval or disapproval of character traits and persons "only as they announced from [our] peculiar bespeak of view..." Rather, "nosotros fix on some steady and general points of view; and always, in our thoughts, place ourselves in them, whatsoever may be our present situation" (T 581-82), in social club to "correct" our situated sentiments. This seems to create ii serious difficulties for Hume's theory. First, moral evaluations become anterior, empirical beliefs nigh what we would feel if nosotros really occupied the imagined common indicate of view, and hence are the deliverances of causal reason; this contradicts Hume'due south merits that the making of a moral evaluation is not an action of reason but of sentiment. Secondly, given Hume's thesis that the passions practise not represent anything else, he cannot say that our moral evaluations volition better represent the object beingness judged if they are made from the mutual signal of view. This leaves no articulate reason to adopt it, rather than making judgments from our real position. Hume says that left to our particular points of view, we will encounter contradictions and be unable to communicate, but it is difficult to see why. My interpretation resolves these two difficulties. I contend that every time nosotros reflect upon someone's grapheme from the common indicate of view, nosotros feel an bodily sentiment of approbation or disapprobation, which may modify and merge with the situated sentiment or may neglect to do and so, leaving two different feelings well-nigh the same grapheme. Furthermore, whenever we make moral evaluations nosotros also simultaneously make objective, causal judgments well-nigh the love and hatred, pride and humility that the trait will produce. We routinely take upward the common bespeak of view in social club to achieve truth and consistency in our causal judgments, to avoid grave practical problems.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Enquiry was founded in 1940 by Marvin Farber, who edited information technology for forty years. Since 1980 it has been at Brown, where it has been edited past Roderick Chisholm so, since 1986, by Ernest Sosa. From its founding, the periodical has been open to a variety of methodologies and traditions. This may be seen in the list of outstanding contributors through the years, which includes: Edmund Husserl, Ernest Nagel, C.I. Lewis, Alfred Tarski, Martin Buber, Rudolf Carnap, Arthur Lovejoy, Gustav Bergmann, Nelson Goodman, Arthur Pap, Roy Wood Sellars, Wilfrid Sellars, C.J. Ducasse, Roderick M. Chisholm, Lewis White Beck, Brand Blanshard, John Findlay, Morton White, and J.J.C. Smart. This tradition of openness continues, as reflected past a statement appearing in every issue: "PPR publishes articles in a wide range of areas including philosophy of heed, epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, and philosophical history of philosophy. No specific methodology or philosophical orientation is required in submissions."
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Source: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2953805
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